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LENDER LIABll.JTY UNDER CERCLA: AN OVERVIEW FOR BUSINESS 
LAW COURSES 
by 
Peter A Martin* and Susan Lorde Martin** 
I NTRODUCTION 
In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 The statute created a stir within the lending institution community 
that, despite various changes in the law, still exists today. This paper discusses the lender liability 
provisions of CERCLA It is concerned with the mortgage lender who, without actively 
participating in the management of a company, forecloses on the company's property when the 
company declares bankruptcy after having contaminated the property with hazardous waste. 
Under current law, it is possible, but by no means definite, that such a lender would be held liable 
for the costs of cleaning up the contaminated site. That situation is not in the best interests of 
either lenders or the environment. This paper advocates a return to a sensible but voided 1992 
EPA rule in order to achieve a greater consistency in the law, a better business climate for lenders, 
and a cleaner environment. The importance of these three goals and their interaction makes 
CERCLA a suitable topic for inclusion in survey business law or legal environment courses. 
This paper traces the history of lender liability law under CERCLA. The first section 
notes the relevant statutory language of CERCLA itself: case law, the significant EPA regulation, 
and some state statutes. Then the paper shows how current law applies to the potentially liable 
lender who forecloses and suggests actions a lender can take to avoid CERCLA liability. In so 
doing, it points out the flaws in the current law and suggests alternative amendments. The next 
section concludes that for the good of lending institutions, businesses, and the environment, 
Congress should amend CERCLA's secured creditor exemption so that it resembles the now 
voided EPA rule. The final part discusses how and why this topic fits into the business law 
curriculum. 
This article received the Hoehlein Award for Distinguished paper at the 1996 Annual Conference 
of the North East Academy ofLegal Studies in Business Lake Mohonk, New York. 
*Associate Director of Legal Affairs, Banner Holdings, Inc., Los Angeles, California 
**Associate Professor ofBusiness Law, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University 
DEVEWPMENT OF FORECWSURE iSSUES UNDER CER.CLA 
CERCLA 
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to provide a means to clean up contaminated hazardous 
waste sites and to hold those parties deemed responsible for the contamination, liable for cleanup 
costs. 2 This statute immediately changed how creditors evaluate the risk in making mortgage 
loans to companies that produce hazardous wastes. Normally, a lender will evaluate market risk, 
that is the risk that interest rates will go up, and credit risk. 3 Credit risk is the risk that the 
borro;er will fail to perform its contractual obligation to repay the loan. 4 To assess the credit risk 
of a commercial borrower, the mortgage lender would ordinarily consider such factors as cash 
flow, payment history, and a business history of stability or growth. 5 After the enactment of 
hazardous materials. Such risks are difficult to calculate, especially when the lender does not 
become significantly involved with the company's decision making or ownership unless and until 
the company enters bankruptcy and the lender then forecloses on its contaminated site. The 
difficulty exists because the statutory language of CERCLA does not clearly indicate under which 
specific circumstances such a lender should be liable for cleanup costs. 
CERCLA imposes liability upon the following general categories of responsible parties: 
(I) present owners and operators of a facility in which hazardous substances are located; (2) 
owners and operators of the facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances; (3) generators 
of hazardous substances; and (4) persons who accept hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal sites or treatment facilities. 6 In addition, CERCLA creates a security interest exemption, 
stating that an "owner" or "operator" "does not include a person, who, without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security 
interest in the vessel or facility."7 By failing to define vague terminology like "indicia of 
ownership," and "participation in the management," Congress left it to the courts to determine if 
and when lenders are "owners" who are liable for cleanup costs. 
Early Cases wuier CERCLA 
With such vague statutory language, it is not surprising that different courts interpreted the 
statute differently, confusing a lender's risk calculation process even more. 8 Several well known 
cases illustrate the problem. 
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trost Co. ,9 the United States District Court in 
Maryland focused on the "owner and operator" language of CERCLA and determined that 
Congress intended to hold liable owners of contaminated sites who were not operators, that is, 
owners who were not involved in the management of the company, as well as owner/operators. 10 
Therefore the court concluded that a bank which had foreclosed on a contaminated site primarily 
to protect' its security interest was an owner, and was liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA11 
The court noted that if the bank were exempted from liability, the federal government would have 
to pay for the cleanup and then the bank would enjoy a windfall, profiting from the increased value 
of the decontaminated property. 12 The court pointed out, however, that in the instant case, the 
foreclosing bank had held the property for nearly four years, suggesting that it was the length of 
time that made this lender a liable party under CERCLA. 13 
If the Maryland court was indicating that a lender would not be an "owner" if it sold the 
foreclosed property more quickly, then its decision is consistent with the ruling of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Mirabile, 14 a case 
decided several months before Marylcmd Bank. In Mirabile, the bank that foreclosed, held title to 
the contaminated site for four months before assigning it. Although the Pennsylvania court's 
opinion focused primarily on determining what constitutes participation in management, it also 
asserted that mere foreclosure does not necessarily impose liability upon a lender. 15 As long as the 
lender limited its involvement with the property to the "financial aspects of management" without 
managing the quotidian production aspects of the business, then the lender would escape 
CERCLA liability. 16 This formulation recognized the legitimate protection of a security interest by 
foreclosing and taking title. 
Other CERCLA cases concerning lender liability emphasized the lender's behavior in the 
period of time before foreclosure and the issue of participation in management, arriving at varied 
conclusions about whether or not mere foreclosure was enough to impose liability.17 However, 
these issues of pre-foreclosure behavior on the one hand, and foreclosure followed by some post-
foreclosure behavior on the other, overlapped in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.18 That case 
arose after Fleet agreed to lend money to Swainsboro Print Works obtaining as collateral a 
security interest in Swainsboro's textile facility and all of its equipment. 19 Five years later 
Swainsboro entered into bankruptcy, and Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in some of the 
inventory and equipment.20 Approximately two years later the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) inspected the facility, found large amounts of toxic chemicals and asbestos on the premises, 
and incurred $400,000 in clean-up costs.Z1 The EPA then sued the principal officers and 
stockholders of Swainsboro and Fleet to recover the cost of cleaning up the toxic materials. 22 The 
district court denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment and Fleet appealed to the United States 
District Court for the Eleventh Circuit. 23 
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the critical issue was "whether Fleet participated in 
management sufficiently to incur liability" or was an "operator" under the statute and would, 
therefore, not be entitled to CERCLA's exemption for a holder of "indicia of ownership primarily 
to protect his security interest. "24 This case was the first federal appellate court case to consider 
this issue.Z5 The Eleventh Circuit rejected as too permissive the Mirabile court's approach of 
exempting from liability lenders who were involved in financial management of a facility but not in 
operational management. 26 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit held that a secured creditor would be 
liable for environmental clean-ups if it was sufficiently involved in the financial management of the 
facility "to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. "27 
Although this case strictly focused upon the time period before foreclosure, its holding 
could have ramifications for lenders whose involvement in management takes place post-
foreclosure, therefore, this decision caused a certain wariness in lenders of all levels of involvement 
at all times. The standard articulated in Fleet has the potential for being extended to incorporate a 
lender whose "capacity to influence" occurs only post-foreclosure, when the lender actually 
"owns" the site. 
EPA sLender Liability Rule 
In 1992 the EPA promulgated its own lender liability rule?8 It clarified CERCLA's 
security exemption rule, undercutting the strictness of the Fleet Factors rule, and specifically 
shielding from liability lenders who had minimal roles in the bankrupt company's operations until 
foreclosure. The rule explicitly defined, inter alia, the terms "indicia of ownership"29 and 
"primarily to protect a security interest."30 Most importantly for a lender, the rule stated that the 
lender can avoid liability when foreclosing on a contaminated site, 
provided that the holder [i.e., lender who forecloses] undertakes to sell, 
re-lease property held pursuant to a lease financing transaction 
(whether by a new lease financing transaction or substitution of the 
lessee), or otherwise divest itself of the property in a reasonably 
expeditious manner, using whatever commercially reasonable means 
are relevant and appropriate with respect to the vessel or facility, taking 
all facts and circumstances into consideration, and provided that the 
holder did not participate in management. 31 
This rule had some vague terminology of its own, such as "reasonably expeditious manner," but 
nevertheless went far in clarifYing what actions a lender could take in foreclosure proceedings 
without incurring liability. It provided more structure and better guidelines for lenders than did 
most of the case law existing at the time of its promulgation. It specifically described the 
procedures a lender can and must take before, during and after the foreclosure process in order to 
preserve the exemption. 
Furthermore, the rule gave lenders greater leeway in dealing with foreclosed property 
without risking CERCLA liability as an owner. Provided that the lender did not "participate in 
prior to foreclosure,32 the rule allowed the lender to engage in procedures to 
liqwdate or the property, or wind up operations on the site without subjecting itself to 
CERCLA 
Kelley v. EPA 
The EPA rule was judicially challenged in 1994 in Kelley v. EPA. 34 In that case the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress had not 
granted the EPA the authority to identifY specific circumstances under which a lender should be 
deemed an owner or operator under CERCLA.35 The court explained that CERCLA specifically 
authorizes the EPA to promulgate rules and regulations concerning various activities, 36 and these 
activities do not include further definition ofCERCLA terminology to determine lender liability.37 
Thus, the court voided the EPA lender liability rule, and with it any decisions which had relied 
upon the EPA rule. In 1995 the EPA removed the rule from the Code ofFederal Regulations38 
The Kelley decision created a general uncertainty like that existihg prior to the promulgation of the 
EPA rule. Of most concern to lenders, it potentially returned the state of the law back to the 
vagueness, and possible strictness, of the Fleet Factors rule that suggested that any financial 
management by lenders might create CERCLA liability.39 
Pro-lender Law Despite Kelley 
Despite this setback for lenders, recent case law has signified a trend towards more 
favorable rulings for lenders. There had been several decisions favoring lenders before Kelley that 
did not rely upon the EPA rule. Therefore, despite Kelley, the following pro-lender cases are still 
persuasive. 
In United States v. McLamb40 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that although a bank "owns" a property when it forecloses on it, if the bank takes swift action 
to place the property on the market, does not use or manage the property during its ownership, 
and sells the property promptly, the bank is acting "primarily to protect its security interest" and, 
therefore, is not liable under CERCLA.41 In this case the Wachovia Bank & Trust Company had 
taken a security interest in 217 acres of land as collateral for a loan it had made to the land's 
owner, Otto Skipper42 When Skipper defaulted on the loan the following year, Wachovia 
purchased the land as the sole bidder at a foreclosure sale.43 Prior ·to Skipper's borrowing from 
W achovia, he had allegedly disposed of toxic waste on the land which was subsequently cleaned 
up by the United States Coast Guard. 44 W achovia asserted that the only reason it bought the 
property at the foreclosure sale was to protect its security interest. 45 Several days after the 
purchase, Wachovia signed a contract with local realtors to sell the property, and it was sold 
shortly thereafter.46 Following the foreclosure, Wachovia made no attempt to develop or manage 
the property.47 
In the court's opinion, the bank's actions indicated that the bank had no profit motive for 
acquiring the property through foreclosure. 4s. The court's rationale is significant because it relied 
directly upon the language of CERCLA to formulate its holding. The EPA rule, still valid at the 
time this case was decided, was mentioned and addressed merely as a supporting argument. 49 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has ruled on this subject twice. 5° 
In Waterville Industries v. Finance Authority the court opined that the maturation of ownership of 
a holder of a security interest does not cause the holder/owner to lose CERCLA's security interest 
exemption as long as the lender/owner divests itself of ownership within a reasonable time. 51 The 
court explained that although CERCLA does not explicitly sanction a safe divestiture period, such 
a "safety zone" must be implicit in the statute otherwise lenders with unwanted ownership thrust 
upon them would be subject to a sudden CERCLA liability. 52 In so ruling, the First Circuit 
acknowledged that the EPA regulations comported with its own decision, but emphasized that the 
court reached its own conclusion "independently of the regulations. "53 The court mentioned the 
dearth of case law on the subject, noting that the United States District Court for _the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania 54 and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio 55 supported their approach while the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania56 opposed their position, choosing a stricter interpretation ofCERCLA.57 The court 
distinguished their case from Maryland Bank because the lender in the latter case failed to 
promptly resell the property after foreclosure. 58 
State Statutes 
Recently enacted state statutes assessing liability for clean-up costs caused by the state-
prohibited release of hazardous materials also reflect a pro-lender trend. For example, New Jersey 
has passed a lender liability statute similar to that of the now voided EPA rule. 59 It specifically 
delineates the procedures a lender must take after foreclosure in order to escape toxic waste 
cleanup liability when attempting to divest itself of the property.60 Delaware law simply exempts 
any "commercial lending institution which acquires ownership or control of a property to realize a 
security interest,"61 while Texas law exempts lenders who own a security interest in a storage tank 
unless the state determines that the lender's control is a contributing cause of the release of 
contaminants from the tank. 62 
A NALY?JNG CURRENT LAW 
Strategies for Lenders to Avoid CERLLA Liability 
Considering the law as it stands, there are several courses of action lenders can take to 
avoid CERCLA liability. They could take the extreme position of avoiding dealing with any 
industry group that generates hazardous wastes, or at least those known to be likely to 
contaminate above specified levels. This would, however, result in the loss of many potentially 
profitable business opportunities. Yet, in many circumstances and for many lenders, avoiding the 
CERCLA situation may be the most economically viable option. 63 The cost of cleanup could far 
outweigh the value of a contaminated site. 
Alternatively, because cases in certain jurisdictions have demonstrated that lenders who 
foreclose can escape liability, a careful lender who accurately calculates the risks might be able to 
successfully transact business with industry groups known to contaminate. A lender that passes 
on too many of these business opportunities may find itself in poor financial condition. 
A wise lender, even under the current law, might be able to take necessary steps to avoid 
liability except in the strictest jurisdictions. First and foremost, prior to any initial agreement with 
a company, the lender should conduct an environmental site assessment. This environmental audit 
requires a physical inspection of the site in order to find out if there is any present contamination 
or risk of potential future violations. If there is none, an adequate environmental assessment could 
provide the basis of an "innocent purchaser" defense under CERCLA.64 CERCLA provides that 
there will be no liability for a person "who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the release . . . of a hazardous substance . . . [was] caused solely by . . . an act or omission of a 
third party [and that] he exercised due care . . . and he took precautions against foreseeable acts or 
omissions of any such third party. "65 The foregoing defense may not be available if the guilty third 
party was acting in connection with a contractual relationship with the asserted "innocent 
purchaser. "66 However, CERCLA also provides that such a contractual relationship (as would 
exist between a bank and its borrower) would not preclude the "innocent purchaser" defense as 
long as the person asserting the defense "did not know and had no reason to know [at the time of 
acquiring the property] that any hazardous substance . . . was disposed of on, in, or at the 
[property] . "67 In order to establish that he had no reason to know about any contamination, the 
"innocent purchaser" would have to "have undertaken ... all appropriate inquiry into the previous 
ownership and uses ofthe property."68 
Thus, the lender should review the company's files for indications of contamination 
problems. The lender should also review the law in the relevant jurisdiction. If the environmental 
inquiries indicate contamination or the potential for contamination then the lender would have 
crucial information for making an informed decision whether to proceed with the transaction. 
Furthermore, and very importantly, the lender should be sure to carefully structure the language of 
the loan agreement, so that it clearly excludes the type of involvement or day-to-day management 
of the company that would deem the lender liable under strict interpretations of CERCLA, such as 
that in Fleet Factors. A wise lender could make a case by case analysis of the environmental risks 
to arrive at an informed business decision concerning whether or not to proceed with the loan 
transaction. 
The situation changes, however, if unexpected contamination on the site occurs after the 
loan agreement has been made, and the company enters bankruptcy69 forcing the lender, under 
ordinary circumstances, to foreclose on the property. In this event, the lender should follow the 
now voided EPA rule's guidelines: it should immediately put the property on the market and 
demonstrate a serious effort to transfer the property, selling it upon receiving the first fair offer. 
By so doing, a lender would be able to show that it was acting primarily to protect its security 
interest, and would most likely escape liability, except in jurisdictions like the D. C. Circuit which 
choose to use the stricter interpretations of CERCLA The problem with this course of action is 
that a lender making a good faith effort to sell the property might have difficulty in doing so 
because buyers would be wary of acquiring title to a contaminated site, and running the risk of 
liability. A potential buyer might much prefer to spend more money to operate a facility on a new, 
uncontaminated site rather than pay less for the contaminated site and assume cleanup costs. With 
this potential situation, it would be wise for the lender to have another environmental audit 
performed before foreclosing. If the assessment indicates that the site is severely contaminated, 
the lender might choose not to foreclose at all, but to cut its losses and abandon the property. 
Such a sequence of events creates serious environmental concerns. CERCLA's liability 
scheme certainly serves as a deterrent to toxic contamination; however, it also serves to force 
industries to make economically justifiable decisions to contaminate new sites ("greenfields") 
instead of reusing already contaminated sites ("brownfields").70 This results not only in an 
inefficient use ofland, but it also contributes to urban decay. As contaminated sites in urban areas 
become abandoned, industries flock to greenfields, risking contamination to previously untainted 
properties.71 CERCLA does not address this negative effect. As long as it remains economically 
sound, companies will continue this process, thereby putting the public surrounding these 
abandoned brownfields at risk as well as continuing to further contaminate greenfields. 
Problems with the Current Law 
Because the cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site is so high, it takes only a very 
minimal risk of contamination to deter a lender from doing business with any industry group that 
might create hazardous waste. This might seem beneficial: if lenders refuse to do business with 
hazardous waste producing companies and choose to deal only with low risk industries, these 
high risk groups would be forced to find ways to reduce their risk of contamination. However, for 
many industries, it is technologically and/or economically impossible to rid themselves completely 
of their hazardous waste products. Because some of these industries are vital, it is necessary for 
them to be able to receive fair loans. CERCLA, by requiring hazardous waste producers to clean 
up contaminated sites, usually at great cost, already creates enough of an incentive for these high 
risk groups to reduce their potential risk of contamination without putting additional pressure on 
the lenders. 72 
A survey conducted by the American Bankers Association, a trade association of 
commercial banks, after the Fleet Factors decision indicated that eighty-eight percent of the 
commercial bank respondents changed their lending practices to avoid CERCLA liability by 
making fewer loans to companies generating hazardous waste. 73 More than sixty-two percent 
reported rejecting loan applications if there was any possibility of hazardous environmental 
liability.74 More than forty-five percent stopped making loans to any business that used chemicals, 
such as dry cleaning establishments, gas stations, and, ironically, environmental cleanup firms.75 
This is not a desirable outcome. These businesses provide necessary services, and they cannot do 
so without using chemicals that are potential contaminants. The threat of having to pay to clean 
up any land they contaminate should be enough to get these businesses to use environmentally 
sound procedures for disposing of their byproducts. Putting them out of business by denying them 
financing is not an appropriate means for achieving a safe environment. Current law unnecessarily 
deters lenders from transactions that would be beneficial to both the lender and the borrower, 
without achieving a concomitant environmental benefit. 
The current law also creates problems because of its encouragement of using greenfields 
instead of reusing brownfields. Moreover, the inconsistency in various courts' interpretations of 
CERCLA creates problems of its own. A lender could have entirely different risk calculation 
strategies depending upon the location of the transaction. The law concerning CERCLA liability 
should be changed. At the very least, it should create some consistency in this area of the law. 
CORRECTING CERCLA'S PROBLEMS 
The simplest and most reasonable alternative is a return to the now voided EPA rule. 
Either Congress should specifically authorize the EPA to promulgate this rule through an 
amendment to CERCLA, or it should amend CERCLA's secured creditor exemption so that it 
resembles the EPA's lender liability rule. Either amendment would encourage lending to 
companies with small risks of potential contamination that might be denied capital under the 
current law. At the same time, although the amendment would be giving more deference to 
lenders, it would not encourage lenders to make environmentally detrimental business 
transactions. Lenders would not want to undertake the difficulties of foreclosing on contaminated 
property that would have to be transferred expeditiously. 
Another alternative that is used in other countries and has been advocated by industry 
groups would be to amend CERCLA's rule of joint and several liability that holds all potentially 
responsible parties liable for one hundred percent of the cleanup costs, and create instead a "fair 
share" liability scheme in which parties would be liable only to the extent that they are actually 
responsible?6 This plan, however, would tip lenders' risk calculations too far the other way, 
encouraging lenders to make some loans they would not under the current law or the proposed 
return to the EPA rule. To remove all lender liability would create fewer incentives to be diligent 
about creating a safe environment. Congress should amend the secured creditor exemption of 
CERCLA and incorporate the language of the EPA rule into it. The EPA rule would create 
circumstances under which both economic and environmental interests would be satisfied. 
USING CERCLA'S LENDER LIABILITY PROVISIONS IN TilE BUSINESS LAW CURRICULUM 
Today's American college students have known about, and been concerned about, 
environmental issues since elementary school Often, however, their ideas on the subject are 
rather absolute and unsophisticated. They know that the air and water should be the cleanest they 
can be and all hazardous waste should be cleaned up. They have given little thought, however, to 
what "cleaning up" hazardous waste actually entails, what it costs, and who should pay for it. 
Considering the issues involved in lender liability created by CERCLA gives students the 
opportunity to think about the ramifications of environmental legislation for the business 
community, and the desirability of aligning business interests and environmental interests. 
A review of the circumstances of the enactment of CERCLA, following the debacle at 
Love Canal, gives students a feel for the legislative process: that major legislative changes 
generally are a response to major societal crises. A discussion of why Congress decided to hold 
responsible for cleanup costs parties who may not be morally responsible at all, can encourage 
consideration of the economics of environmental health. Comparing court opinions that use 
similar facts to arrive at disparate conclusions should suggest to students that it is difficult to arrive 
at "right" answers in the law; it is the well reasoned response we are seeking. The CERCLA 
statute and the EPA rule provide opportunities to view the relationship between Congress and 
administrative agencies, as well as the relationship between a statute, an administrative regulation, 
and court opinions. Finally, considering the role oflenders in the business community and the role 
they should play in environmental situations can provide an opportunity for critiquing current law 
and creating a new and better statute. 
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EXAMINING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE IN MENTAL DISABil-ITY 
DISCRIMINATION CASES and RAISING QUESTIONS ON SHIFTING 
BURDENS 
by 
Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey* 
Introduction 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state 
disability discrimination laws, all of which prohibit discrimination against persons with 
handicaps or disabilities, require employers to think twice before taking action against 
applicants or employees who fall into this legally protected category. Though the 
common perception that the primary beneficiaries of these laws would be the wheelchair-
bound, hearing or vision impaired persons, and others with various physical ailments, a 
study by the National Center for Health Statistics showed that as of December 1994, 
psychiatric impairments were the second largest category of complaints to the EEOC--at 
11%. The largest category was persons with back-related problems [1]. The numerous 
forms that mental disabilities take present unique problems to parties concerned with 
implementation of, or compliance with, those laws. Learning disabilities alone Gust one 
of the many mental disability categories) have had a major impact, not only on educational 
institutions and employers, but also on professional licensing bodies which administer 
proficiency tests--for example, in 1994, of the 1,250 applicants who requested 
accommodations for taking the LSAT test, 62% claimed to have a learning disability [2]. 
Recent cases alleging discrimination by persons claiming mental disabilities in an 
employment context are the focus of this paper. After extensive discussion of the prima 
facie case and what factors are considered by the courts when faced with mental disability 
discrimination cases, the focus shifts to an examination of the shifting burden of proof in 
these cases. The author concludes that there is a lack of consistency in court cases on the 
issue of burden of proof This inconsistency makes it difficult to predict how any court 
will decide a particular disability case. 
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